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QUALIA
Robert Merrihew Adams

David Lewis and I are continuing here a discussion about a paper of mine
entitled"Flavors, Colors, and God,'" in which I argue that the prospects for
an adequate explanation of the correlation of phenomenal qualia with physical properties are more promising on theistic than on naturalistic assumptions. This provides, not a conclusive proof, but a valuable contribution to a
cumulative case, for theism. I will not rehearse the whole argument; we are
concerned here with one objection to it, an objection that I anticipated and
that I take Lewis to embrace. This objection is that on a sufficiently materialist view, there is no correlation to be explained, for the phenomenal qualia
are not correlated, but identical, with physical properties of the central nervous system.
A sufficiently materialist view for this objection entails not merely the substantial identity of mind and central nervous system, but a thorough-going
physicalism about all phenomena. Otherwise it will still be possible for me to
begin my argument by raising the question why the states I am in when I am
having certain experiences seem to me the way they do---why seeing red is
(subjectively but consistently) like this, rather than seeming to me the way
those states seem that in fact are experiences of seeing yellow. I argued that a
materialism that would deny me this "would have to eliminate phenomenal
qualia, or reduce them in a most extreme way to physical qualities."2
Lewis objects to my suggestion that this would have to be a "radical" or
"desperate" eliminativism about qualia. 3 He thinks a materialist-indeed, I
take it, a physicalist who would escape my theistic argument-can in an
important sense believe in qualia. In his paper he explains the extent to
which this is possible. Lewis's account of what the physicalist can accept
about qualia is predictably incisive and elegant; I have no quarrel with it.
My disagreement concerns what the physicalist cannot accept. "See how little he eliminates," Lewis urges: Much too much, I reply.
The one aspect of qualia, as commonly understood, that Lewis admits to
eliminating is what he calls the Identification Thesis, the thesis that "we identify the qualia of our experiences" as he puts it,' or that phenomenal qualia
are "qualities whose identity is completely determined by subjective experience," as I put it in "Flavors, Colors, and God."" This appears to be an epistemological claim. Why should we balk at giving it up, Lewis may ask, when
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he grants us several other ways of knowing what experiences we have, and
even what qualia, in the physicalist's restricted sense, we have?
More than epistemology is at stake here. It is not just a matter of how we
know, but also, and even more, of what we know. It is not easy to say what
we know in our knowledge of phenomenal qualia. Lewis rightly remarks
that philosophers "never say enough to introduce the concept [of phenomenal qualial from scratch to someone who doesn't already have it."7 The difficulty here is similar to the notorious difficulty in explaining the character of
particular qualia to people who have not experienced them. What is the
visual appearance of red like? Can we say anything better than Locke's congenitally blind man who conjectured that it would be like the sound of a
trumpet? Nonetheless those of us who are blessed with normal color vision
do know something here that most of us are very glad to know, though we
cannot explain it very well.
Enough can be said about it, I think, to make the point that qualia give us
an important sort of knowledge that Lewis's physicalism cannot admit we
have. Consider the following experience as an example. I recently saw for
the first time a painting of which I had previously seen many reproductions,
Warner Sallman's Head of Christ. It is not much to my taste, though I recognize that it's brilliantly successful in a way and has been religiously meaningful to millions of people. Nonetheless, I wanted to see it. Why? I think
my main motive was curiosity. I did enjoy seeing it, though I hadn't particularly expected to; the original is better than the reproductions. Still, I haveplenty of opportunity to see paintings that afford me more aesthetic pleasure. I wanted mainly to see, and thereby to know, what it looked like.
What is it that I wanted to know, and did in fact know, in this way?
Obviously I wanted to know something about the painting. But at the same
time, and inseparably, I wanted to know something (something qualitative)
about the experience of seeing the painting. It is the latter knowledge that
concerns us here. It is knowledge that I can have, as 1 do have it, in almost
complete ignorance of the physical qualities of the brain states that I have in
having the experience.
What can this knowledge be, on Lewis's account? He can allow that I
have "a rich cluster of descriptions" of the painting and of my experience.
Similarly he allows that "I do know what relations of acquaintance I bear"
to "the various qualia of my experience.'" But this leaves out the most
important knowledge that I want and have in seeing the painting. I want to
know what the qualities of my experience are like, not just how I am related
to them. And this is a knowledge that is not exhausted by any set of
descriptions I could give; it is something much richer and more comprehensive that precedes and grounds my ability to give the descriptions. Lewis
also grants that I may have de re knowledge of the physical properties that
constitute, according to the physicalist, my qualia." But such de re knowledge too is not the qualitative knowledge that I seek, and obtain, of what
the experience is like.
So far as I can see, the qualitative knowledge of my experience that is
most important to me in aesthetic matters, and in the satisfaction of plain
ordinary sensory curiosity, is part of what Lewis's materialism does eliminate. How important we think that is may depend on how highly we value
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the contemplative as distinct from the active side of life. Lewis has suggested elsewhere that "knowing what [a phenomenal quale is] like is the possession of abilities: abilities to recognize, abilities to imagine, abilities to predict
one's behavior by means of imaginative experiments."'o No doubt I did
acquire such abilities with regard to the qualities of the experience I was having when I saw Sallman's Head of Christ. But the acquisition of such abilities
was surely not the main object of my curiosity about the experience I would
have. What I chiefly wanted was something much less dispositional that I
had ill the visual experience itself. I grant that Lewis can account for just
about anything I may want to do with my knowledge of my qualia. What
fares less well under the physicalist regime is a knowledge I may enjoy, or
suffer, in my experience, over and above any active ability or disposition I
may derive from it. Such contemplative knowledge, I believe, includes a
very large part of what makes life worth living.
Why do I believe that I have this knowledge that is so hard to articulate? I
think that I observe it, introspectively, as directly and surely as I observe
anything at all-at least as directly and surely as I observe the words in the
page in front of me. Indeed I actually believe that I observe the former more
directly and surely than the latter, but that is more than I need to maintain
for present purposes. ll
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